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The China factor in the US–South Korea alliance:
the perceived usefulness of China in the Korean
Peninsula1
HYON JOO YOO*
Over the past 10 years, South Korea has chosen inconsistent strategies with
respect to the US–South Korea alliance. On the one hand, Seoul disagreed
with Washington about the extended role of United States Forces Korea and
the deployment of US missile defence systems in East Asia. On the other
hand, these problems ironically coincided with South Korea’s strong support
for the USA in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. What explains the
inconsistency of South Korea’s alliance policies? Major schools of thought in
international relations have offered explanations, but their analyses are
deficient and indeterminate. This article looks at the South Korea–China–
North Korea triangle as a new approach to explaining the puzzling
behaviour of South Korea. The model shows that South Korea’s alliance
policies are driven by two causal variables. First, North Korea is an
impelling force for South Korea to remain as a strong US alliance partner.
This encourages Seoul to maintain cooperation with Washington in wide-
ranging alliance tasks. Second, South Korea’s policies are likely to reflect the
way the nation perceives how useful China is in taming North Korea. The
perceived usefulness of China causes Seoul to accommodate China and
decrease cooperation with the USA. This might strain the relationship with
the USA should South Korea evade alliance missions that might run contrary
to China’s security interests.
Keywords: China; missile defence; North Korea; strategic flexibility; US–
South Korea alliance
Introduction
Over the past 10 years, the US–South Korea alliance has gone through a
profound transformation. While the strategic utility of this security relationship
is the deterrence of North Korea, it has been redesigned to confront regional
problems and global challenges. During this period, the modification of the
alliance has resulted in tension between the two allies due, in part, to
inconsistent and even contradictory policy choices employed by South Korea.
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On the one hand, Seoul disagreed with Washington over the extended role of
United States Forces Korea (USFK) and the deployment of US missile defence
(MD) systems in East Asia. In the end, South Korea reluctantly and partially
accommodated the USA, but the two partners still hold divergent views on the
necessity of the US-led MD programs and the feasibility of USFK’s operations
outside the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, these problems ironically
coincided with South Korea’s strong economic and military support for the US
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, the Seoul government constantly
stressed the importance of the alliance and gave unequivocal commitment to
strengthening bilateral relations with the USA. What explains the inconsistency
of South Korea’s alliance policies? Major schools of thought in international
relations offer incomplete and indeterminate explanations for this phenomenon.
This article employs the South Korea–China–North Korea triangle as a new
approach to explaining the puzzling behaviour of South Korea. This model
shows that South Korea’s alliance policies are driven by two causal variables.
First, North Korea works as an impelling force to make South Korea a
supportive alliance partner for the USA. As policy elites in both Seoul and
Washington agree, the alliance has addressed important security problems
regarding North Korea’s nuclear threats, other types of weapons of mass
destruction, and military adventurism driven by the belief that offensive
manoeuvres will pay off. Second, South Korea’s policies also reflect the way
the nation perceives how useful China is in taming North Korea. Seoul seems to
believe that Beijing would be able to curtail Pyongyang’s aggressive behaviour
by withholding economic assistance and political support.
In other words, while the threat of North Korea encourages Seoul to maintain
cooperation with Washington in wide-ranging alliance tasks, the perceived
usefulness of China in handling North Korea causes South Korea to decrease
cooperation with the USA with respect to some regional security problems.
More specifically, with the perceived usefulness of China, South Korea will
choose to accommodate China. This might strain the relationship with the USA
should South Korea evade alliance missions that might run contrary to China’s
security interests. However, the existing North Korean threat will simulta-
neously compel the Seoul government to maintain strong support for the USA in
alliance missions that do not directly concern China. Conversely, when Beijing is
perceived to be ineffective in precluding Pyongyang’s aggression, South Korea
increases cooperation with the USA, even in the areas that might cause problems
with China. Such action by Seoul will strengthen security relations with
Washington while creating tension with the government in Beijing.
The article begins by addressing why previous analyses are deficient and
indeterminate in explaining South Korea’s inconsistent alliance policy options.
Second, it offers a new approach based on dyad threats that explains the
bilateral relationship between China and North Korea, and examines Seoul’s
perception about the usefulness of China. In the following section, the new
theoretical approach is applied to understanding South Korea’s alliance policies
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in the past 10 years. Finally, the article concludes with a summary and discusses
two policy implications.
The puzzle
What explains South Korea’s inconsistent alliance policies? More specifically,
why did the South Korean government provide troops to the US operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq while being reluctant to cooperate with the USA with
regard to the MD programs and USFK’s strategic flexibility? Many scholars in
international relations have offered explanations for the recent developments in
the US–South Korea alliance, but they have failed to provide sufficient analyses.
Realist schools of thought, which put emphasis on the balance of power, stress
that the relative economic and military strength of South Korea, compared to
financially stricken and internationally isolated North Korea, obviates the need
for a strong US–South Korea alliance (Suh 2007). Since the 1950s, when the
alliance was formed, South Korea has successfully transformed from a war-torn
pariah to a key player on the world stage, with the fifteenth largest economy
and a strong military force. For this reason, Seoul’s security policies these days
are increasingly seeking independence from the alliance, such as the refusal to
join the US MD programs. Nevertheless, while the balance of power explains a
general direction of decreasing cooperation between South Korea and the USA,
it is indeterminate why cooperation also exists in helping US forces in the
Middle East and Central Asia. In other words, if the importance of the alliance
is decreasing, why does South Korea bear a costly burden in alliance missions
that are not relevant to the Korean Peninsula?
The balance of power theory also predicts that China’s rising weight in the
Peninsula may generate friction between Washington and Seoul as South Korea
resists some regional security tasks in order to avoid confrontation with China.
China has surpassed the USA as South Korea’s number-one trading partner
since 2004, and historical and cultural ties have offered more ground for Seoul
to work with Beijing than Washington. Hence, scholars have argued that the
changing balance of power in East Asia with China’s ascendance will cause
Seoul’s strategic tilt towards Beijing and the decline of the US–South Korea
alliance (Cha 2004; Chung 2001; Ross 2006). However, this analysis is
overdetermined. While China’s increasing power compels South Korea to
employ pro-China policies, the balance of power logic simultaneously pushes
the nation in an opposite direction to increased cooperation with the USA so as
to balance potential threats emanating from China (Mearsheimer 2001).
Accordingly, the power-driven theory does not indicate to what extent and
under what conditions South Korea would choose China as opposed to the
USA, and vice versa.
Liberal pluralism, which acknowledges the diversity of domestic politics,
shows that South Korea’s alliance policies are inconsistent because various
perspectives exist in South Korean society. On the one hand, there is a group of
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people—liberal and progressive—who do not perceive North Korea as a major
enemy. They believe that the cold war-style competition and confrontation with
North Korea are no longer necessary, and champion flexible approaches to
North Korea. The rampant anti-US sentiment that has existed along with this
view has also caused fraying relations between South Korea and the USA. On
the other hand, there is a group of people who ardently support cooperation
with the USA. They still believe that the USA is the best foreign policy partner
and that the alliance is crucial to Seoul’s national security (Bouton et al. 2004;
East Asia Institute 2011; Hankuk Ilbo 2006). Nevertheless, the theoretical
approach to domestic politics is not without problems. First, it overlooks the
fact that liberal and progressive elites, such as Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh
Moo-hyun, stressed the importance of the alliance to deter North Korea, even
when they were seeking the Sunshine Policy—an engagement policy towards
Pyongyang. Second, President Roh, who was elected with the growing anti-US
sentiment in South Korea, provided strong support for US operations abroad,
despite his unyielding stand towards the alliance and pro-North Korea
approach.
A constructivist view offers an explanation for the existence and sources of
tension in the US–South Korea alliance by relying on the dissimilar national
identities and public views of South Korea and the USA (Shin 2010). However,
it is limited in explicating why South Korea has simultaneously chosen
cooperative and uncooperative policies towards the USA, even though the fact
that people in South Korea and the USA have dissimilar identities remains
unchanged. What, then, explains this inconsistency in South Korea’s alliance
policies?
The perceived usefulness of China
This article looks at the South Korea–China–North Korea triangle as a new
approach to explaining the puzzling behaviour of South Korea with respect to
the alliance. In this triangle, South Korea is a primary state that perceives its
dyad threats—the alliance relations between China and North Korea. For more
than 60 years, Beijing has been an important alliance partner for Pyongyang,
which poses conventional and nuclear threats to the Seoul government (see
Ministry of National Defense 2006). Although the cohesion of the Chinese–
North Korean alignment loosened after the end of the cold war, China
maintains an important diplomatic and economic relationship with North
Korea for strategic reasons (Han 2004; Scobell 2004; Wu 2005). According to
Chinese data, China constitutes nearly 50 percent of the total foreign trade of
North Korea, and that portion is reportedly increasing (Li 2006). In 2008,
China became North Korea’s biggest trading partner, with the volume of their
bilateral trade reaching US$2.7 billion (Aden 2011; Nanto and Manyin 2010).
Scholars have noted that despite constant famine and a slow-growing economy,
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Pyongyang has not collapsed because China has supplied essential energy and
food (Choo 2008; Noland 1997).
China is likely to continue its strategic partnership with North Korea because
consistent financial support gives Beijing an opportunity to exercise influence
over Pyongyang. As Samuel Kim and Tai-hwan Lee (2002, 132) have noted:
‘Since any weakening influence over North Korea would degrade [its] strategic
status in the Korean Peninsula, as well as in Asia, China will invest necessary
capital in North Korea in order to maximize [its] influence over the Korean
affairs’. This explains why the Beijing government has rejected US proposals in
the past to reduce economic exchanges with North Korea—a means to facilitate
the dismantling of nuclear programs (Liu 2003; Shen 2009).
Alliance restraints within dyad threats
The new model deals with a triangle that is composed of a primary state and its
dyad threats (a pair of external threats that forge a security coalition). In the
study of international relations, while scholars have explored alliance dynamics,
they have ignored how such interactions between alliance partners are perceived
by an outside state. In fact, as the alliance literature shows, the relationship
between members of dyad threats exhibits alliance politics (Snyder 1997).
Specifically, members within dyad threats may have dissimilar views regarding
how to approach an outside state. One may disagree with the other when an
aggressive member seeks confrontation or wages war against the outside state.
For instance, while Austria-Hungary and Germany constituted dyad threats for
Russia in 1879, they had different approaches towards Russia. Austria-Hungary
was in constant competition with Russia over the Balkans, while Germany was
reluctant to get involved.
This disagreement within dyad threats will cause friction if one member tries
to restrain the other. As scholars have explored, alliance partners can preclude
each other from undertaking provocative activities (Weitsman 2004). In
particular, the success of restraint hinges in part on who has more material
capability (Pressman 2008). Large powers are more likely to succeed in exerting
restraint over small powers in an asymmetric alliance since the latter relies more
on the former in terms of defence posture and offensive strategies. This is
possible because the larger power will threaten the aggressive partner with
leaving the alliance or withholding material assistance (Snyder 1997).
In this light, the restraining capability of one member (Y) within dyad threats
is significant to the outside state. If the outside state believes that Y is useful in
restraining the aggressive member (X), the state will choose to accommodate Y.
This may cause the primary state to decrease the commitment to its own alliance
partner. Simultaneously, the primary state may choose a competitive strategy
against X, the aggressive member within dyad threats. Conversely, if Y is not
useful in restraining the aggressive member, the primary state does not have to
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differentiate between dyad threats and employ a competitive strategy toward
both of them. (see Figure 1).
China is useful
According to the new model, South Korea, as a primary state, perceives how
useful China is in restraining North Korea. South Korea’s view is that as long as
the strategic partnership between China and North Korea continues to exist,
China will play an important role in preserving the stability of the Korean
Peninsula (see Cha 1999; Lee 1996; Moon 1998; Shambaugh 2004–05). Seoul’s
perception is embedded in the belief that China can be useful in communicating
with North Korea and alleviating tension in the Korean Peninsula. This type of
view has become evident particularly since North Korean provocation. When
Pyongyang detonated nuclear devices in 2009, President Lee Myung-bak stated
that China would be a significant player in a diplomatic effort to terminate
North Korea’s nuclear programs (Seoul Shinmun 2009). The former president,
Kim Dae-jung, immediately called on China to act as a moderator to reduce
tension between the two Koreas (Hangyoreh 2009). South Korean defence
White Papers have also recognised China’s positive role. They have acknowl-
edged the fact that China has reduced arms sales to North Korea since the mid
1980s and precluded North Korea from waging a second Korean war (Ministry
of National Defense 1988, 57–58). While Beijing’s restraining capability was in
question, China froze the energy supply to North Korea in a short period of
time and collaborated with the USA in restricting North Korea’s bank account
in the Banco Delta Asia in 2006. Such Chinese actions temporarily stopped
Pyongyang’s audacious behaviour and brought North Korea back to the six-
party talks.
Alliance restraint within dyad threats X 
and Y
The strategy of a primary state
X is aggressive Competitive strategy against X
Y is useful in restraining X Accommodation with Y
(Decreased commitment to the ally 
of the primary state)
X is aggressive Competitive strategy against X
Y is not useful in restraining X Competitive strategy against Y
Figure 1. The strategy of a primary state.
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China is not that useful
However, as some pundits and scholars have argued, China’s influence on
North Korea seems limited (Ji 2001; Scobell 2004; Snyder 2006). China is
unwilling to stop supplying food and energy to North Korea because punishing
Pyongyang would cause even more reckless behaviour. This concern surfaced
with China’s reaction to the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan,
killing 46 servicemen, near the sea border between the two Koreas in March
2010. The international investigation led by the Seoul government revealed that
a torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine was the cause of the explosion.
The international community, including the USA, Japan and the European
Union, publicly condemned North Korea, while China was extremely cautious.
The Chinese government even questioned the result of this investigation and
declined to participate in South Korea’s effort in the United Nations to blame
North Korea (Segye Ilbo 2010). To South Korea’s disappointment, China met
with the North Korean leader Kim Jong-il without informing the South Korean
president, who had visited Beijing just a few days earlier to discuss the Cheonan
case (Gyeonghyang Shinmun 2010). For many South Koreans, China’s response
was ‘wilful blindness’ towards North Korea’s provocation (Korea Times 2010).
And it frustrated Seoul’s desire to punish North Korea for destroying peace in
the Peninsula (Hankuk Ilbo 2010).
Moreover, the Chinese government, along with North Korea, encouraged
Seoul to move on and proposed that six-party talks begin as soon as possible,
regardless of the Cheonan incident. However, the South Korean government
wanted to identify who had caused the crisis and receive a proper apology from
North Korea before the six parties resumed multilateral talks.
Neither Beijing’s neutrality nor the policy of equidistance between Seoul and
Pyongyang was enough to satisfy South Korea. It started to question China’s
intentions and increasingly believed that China might no longer be useful. The
following section reveals the change in South Korea’s alliance policies as the
country has perceived the usefulness of China dissipating in the past few years,
especially since 2010. It contrasts with earlier years, when China was perceived
as useful.
South Korea’s inconsistent strategies, 2000–9
From 2000 to 2009, Pyongyang’s sporadic ballistic missile tests, nuclear
detonations and naval skirmishes exacerbated tension in the Korean Peninsula.
The more provocative North Korea became, the more useful China became in
defusing tension in the Peninsula. Seoul attempted to avoid confrontation with
China, even if such action might have looked like intransigence to the USA.
However, the nation also made strong commitments to the USA because of the
North Korean threat. This gave rise to inconsistent alliance strategies in South
Korea.
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Confrontation with the USA: MD policy
Seoul evinced no interest in the USA’s MD programs, even after Washington
had made constant requests. One major reason may be found in official
comments made by Korean leaders that South Korea did not want to provoke
China (Chosun Ilbo 2001). According to President Roh, the US anti-missile
architecture would reinstate the cold war competition between the USA, Japan
and China.2 As one Korean scholar has also noted, it was not beneficial for
South Korea to participate in the US systems because such action would
instigate military confrontation in East Asia and deprive Seoul of an
opportunity to promote friendly relations with Beijing (Hong 2004, 91).
South Korea understood China’s apprehension that the US MD programs
would neutralise China’s deterrence capability. Seoul also feared the worst-
case scenario, in which Beijing would develop technologies to get round the US
systems (Kim 2004). A recent development reveals that China has been
enhancing the speed and mobility of existing missiles, while developing solid-
propellant missiles in order to beat the USA’s anti-missile shield. China has
also successfully tested intermediate-range missiles with multiple dummy
warheads that could distract the warning system of the MD programs
(Tompkins 2003).
Instead of joining the regional MD systems, the Seoul government decided to
advance its indigenous programs to monitor North Korea’s short-range missiles
around the clock without assistance from the USA. The focus of South Korea’s
self-reliant systems has been placed deliberately on lower-tier systems that are
designed to protect the major cities and coastal areas of South Korea, rather
than upper-tier systems that would intercept long-range ballistic missiles which
would target beyond the Korean Peninsula. According to some experts,
technologies in the Korean Air and Missile Defence (KAMD) can track an
object 1000 kilometres away, such as missile sites in North Korea, but are not
useful for detecting the long-range ballistic missiles that are deployed in the Jilin
and Liaoning provinces of China.
Nevertheless, China might have believed that the KAMD programs could be
merged into the regional MD structure, since South Korea needs to cooperate
with USFK to collect information and operate its anti-missile programs more
effectively. As some scholars have pointed out, cooperation with the USA is
essential for South Korea in order to improve protection of its territory from
ground to space (Jeon 2000; Park 2008). USFK has X-band radars and the
Defence Support Program—the key elements of US MD—to detect the speed
and trajectory of North Korea’s ballistic missiles more precisely. Furthermore,
South Korea purchased US MD technologies that render its systems interoper-
able with the US command.
However, South Korea clarified that the KAMD programs differ from the
regional US MD systems. When purchasing US Patriot advanced capability
(PAC) for missile interceptors, the Seoul government stressed that the
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procurement was not designed to tap into the US programs. According to some
military experts, the PAC-2 missiles that South Korea chose are not sufficient to
work with the US programs, which, in fact, require PAC-3—an upgraded
version of PAC-2. While PAC-2 is not intended to destroy ballistic missiles, but
to target slow-flying airplanes, the PAC-3 missiles that Washington recom-
mended to Seoul are key elements for the operation of upper-tier systems in the
regional anti-missile programs. South Korea is now considering the procurement
of long-range ship-to-air missiles, such as Standard Missile 6, for the Aegis
system, because the range of the current Standard Missile 2 is too short. Again,
South Korea has stressed that such procurement is for enhancing indigenous
programs and has expressed no interest in joining the USA’s MD systems
(Yonhap News 2008; see Table 1).
Table 1. South Korea’s MD programs and the requirements of the US-led MD systems
Architecture class South Korea’s military procurement US requirements
Land-based
upper tier
Not applicable Theatre High Altitude Area
Defence
Land-based
lower tier
Airborne Early Warning and
Control System
Air and Missile Defence Cell
PAC-2 and KM-Surface to Air
Missile
. Will protect Seoul and its
vicinity
Theatre High Altitude Area
Defence
PAC-3 with remote launchers at
most sites to extend their
coverage
Sea-based
upper tier
Not applicable Aegis
SPY-1 Radar
Navy Theater Wide Standard
Missile-3 (to destroy ballistic
missiles)
. Cannot defend the northern
two-thirds of South Korea
against low-flying short-
range ballistic missiles
Sea-based
lower tier
Aegis Korean Destroyer
Experimental Program-IIIs
SPY1D (radar to detect ballistic
missiles within 1000 kilometres) SM-
2 (to destroy aircraft and cruise
missiles and probably ballistic
missiles)
. Cannot defend critical assets and
population centres inland
Similar to the navy’s defence
system
Sources: Hwang (2008) and US Department of Defense (1999).
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Confrontation with the USA: the flexible use of USFK
Another political confrontation between the USA and South Korea arose when
the former initiated a comprehensive strategic transformation of its military
forces, and the latter reluctantly and partially accepted such a change. The US
Quadrennial Defence Review in 2001 and the Global Posture Review in 2004
called for improved military capability by reducing the number of US ground
troops overseas and reinforcing air and naval forces with advanced technology
(US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services 2004; US Department of
Defense 2001). In line with the Global Posture Review, the realignment of USFK
took place in order to meet future regional contingencies beyond the Korean
Peninsula, such as possible clashes between regional powers over the Taiwan
Strait. The reform of US alliance strategies in East Asia renders flexibility to US
forces to effectively tackle diversified regional security challenges. Along with
the shift of US military strategy, the Japanese government adjusted its foreign
policy. The two alliance partners recognised the security of Taiwan as a
common strategic objective. Expectedly, the Chinese government denounced
Japan and the USA for interfering with its internal affairs and infringing the
sovereignty of China.
Vigilant with regard to China’s response, the South Korean government did
not grant explicit consent for the expansion of the strategic flexibility of USFK.
President Roh noted that:
South Korea would not allow US troops to get involved in any disputes in
Northeast Asia without the consent of the South Korean government. ‘I can clearly
say that our people will not get entangled in regional disputes against our will in
the future’ (Korea Times 2005a).
A few months later, President Roh confirmed this view during his meeting with
President Bush in June 2005. The South Korean Labor Party, Roh’s political
base, espoused this position, stating that an expanded role of USFK would not
only exacerbate military tension in North-East Asia, but would also have a
negative influence on the North Korean nuclear issue (Korea Times 2005b).
People in the Labor Party understood that China was vehemently opposed to
the change of USFK, which would encircle China, and if South Korea accepted
this change, the government might have to forgo getting help from Beijing in
handling nuclear problems in North Korea.
South Korea’s reluctance was regarded as oversensitivity towards China, but
it was not an imprudent action. The Chinese government was believed to have
multiple communication channels to induce North Korea to engage in
multilateral discussions. For instance, China organised a preliminary trilateral
talk with the USA and North Korea in April 2003—the prototype of the current
six-party talks—after more than 50 attempts to contact the government of
Pyongyang (Park 2003). China also provided a venue for multilateral dialogues
and transmitted North Korea’s opinion to the USA and South Korea to facilitate
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communication. Importantly, China’s special position in enjoying formal
diplomatic relations with both North and South Korea raised the hope in South
Korea that China would work as an impartial mediator between the two
Koreas, and perhaps choose a position in favour of South Korea (see Global
Times 2010a).
Washington and Seoul convened annual security consultative meetings and
security policy initiative meetings (major taskforces to discuss the Global
Posture Review) to settle the disagreement, but they failed to reach a consensus.
Some South Korean experts warned that South Korea’s lack of support for the
US plan would destroy the alliance (Park 2011). An increasing number of US
policy makers also voiced complaints, for South Korea was no longer a reliable
alliance partner and its strategic value to the USA was declining considerably
(Heo and Kwon 2005). Although South Korea finally ratified the reorganisation
of USFK after three years of debates, the agreement contained one important
condition which reflected South Korea’s firm position: that South Korea would
remain uninvolved in any regional conflicts against the will of the Korean
people. This makes South Korea’s commitment of cooperation vague, and it
remains debatable whether the country will be involved in regional conflicts or
not.3 The director general of the North American Bureau at the South Korean
Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that: ‘South Korea and the United States
intentionally left the agreement at a broad level without setting rules or
guidelines. We will be discussing details as situations arise’ (Korea Times 2006).
China responded relatively calmly after the agreement between the USA and
South Korea was announced. However, an official remark made by Ning Fu-
kui, Chinese ambassador to Seoul, attracted South Korea’s attention. Ning
stated that China would expect USFK to work within the structure of the US–
South Korea bilateral alliance, but it could not be disinterested if US forces were
to get involved in a third country’s problems outside the Korean Peninsula.4
South Korea interpreted his comment as a warning (Chosun Ilbo 2006).
Strong cooperation with the USA in Iraq and Afghanistan
Ironically, a growing alienation between South Korea and the USA came in
tandem with Seoul’s cooperative policy with respect to other alliance missions.
The South Korean government provided strong support for the US operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan. The Korean leaders justified such actions, noting that the
precarious situation caused by North Korea necessitated a strong alliance with
the USA.
President Roh, a progressive and liberal leader, decided to offer military
assistance for the Iraq War, despite strong public opposition. In March 2003,
only a few months after Roh took office, South Korea dispatched more than
600 non-combat troops, including military medics and engineers. Only six
months after the first troops were dispatched, the Seoul government received
another request from the USA to send more troops to Iraq, this time including
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combat forces. A public opinion survey demonstrated that the majority of the
population was against sending additional combatants because the US operation
was without the authorisation of the United Nations (Joonang Ilbo 2003). Even
liberal elites, Roh’s political base, declared that they would launch a campaign
against the president to keep him from deploying troops. Despite public
opposition and political squabbling, the Roh government decided to deploy
3000 additional troops, but for non-combat operations. Roh’s decision was
sensational because many policy elites in Washington and Seoul observed that
the president had made unfavourable remarks about the alliance and created
trouble with the USA during the negotiations over the transformation of USFK.
This made South Korea the third-largest contributor to the US-led military
coalition in Iraq. For a number of years, approximately 3600 troops were
dispatched by South Korea for operation Iraqi Freedom. It gradually decreased
troop levels to 2300 by the end of 2006 and 1200 in mid 2007.
Roh noted that the dispatch of South Korean forces to Iraq was designed to
reinforce the alliance. He stated that:
When considering the deployment of forces in Iraq, I believed that [the] peace and
stability in the Korean Peninsula was significant. In the situation where the North
Korean nuclear crisis could deteriorate at any moment, I believed that preserving a
strong coalition with the United States was essential.5
The security advisor Lee Jong-seok (2003) made a similar point, claiming that
increasing threats from North Korea were the most influential factor in the
decision to send troops to Iraq. Although a complete withdrawal of South
Korean forces from Iraq was scheduled for the end of 2007, Roh modified the
original plan a few months before the end of his presidency and extended the
date of a complete withdrawal to the end of 2008. This decision came right after
North Korea had conducted its large missile tests and nuclear detonation in
2006. Justifying the extension, the South Korean president stressed once again
that cooperation with the USA was essential. He noted that without the help of
the USA, South Korea would not be able to enjoy a peaceful atmosphere in the
Peninsula.
Irrespective of their political orientations, both liberal and conservative South
Korean leaders have showed similar patterns in supporting US military plans
outside North-East Asia. Former president Kim Dae-jung, another liberal leader,
provided non-combat forces to Afghanistan in response to a US request. Non-
combat troops, including medics and engineers, were deployed to Afghanistan
in 2002 and came back to South Korea at the end of 2007 after almost six years
of service. Like his two predecessors, the current president, Lee Myung-bak, a
conservative leader, has faced similar pressures. During the 2008 summit,
Washington asked Seoul for non-combatant assistance to Afghanistan and, a
year later, for the dispatch of troops. In May 2009, the South Korean
government announced an aid package, including humanitarian and financial
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assistance, with US$19.5 million for job training and hospital construction. A
few months later, South Korea sent additional civilian workers to Afghanistan
and 320 troops to protect them. The first dispatch to Afghanistan was
completed in June 2010.
According to President Kim, the dispatch of South Korean forces to
Afghanistan was active participation in the US-led global War on Terror in
order to reinforce the US–South Korea alliance.6 The Lee government also made
a similar remark that the primary purpose of supporting the USA lay in
strengthening the alliance. One South Korean politician argued that such a
choice would give the South Korean government leverage in obtaining more
cooperation from the USA if a conflict occurred in the Peninsula.7 During a
potential military crisis in the Korean peninsula, the USA would play an
important role, since US leadership could attract help from other countries, such
as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Nevertheless, this does
not necessarily mean that the dispatch of South Korean troops will always
reflect the North Korean threat. In essence, with respect to United Nations
peacekeeping missions, the Seoul government has provided humanitarian
assistance and even combatants to other regions, including Somalia, Angola
and Lebanon. However, when it comes to a request from the USA, South Korea
is mindful of the dynamic situation in the Korean Peninsula and, more
specifically, of the role of the alliance in deterring North Korea. Particularly
with regard to the situation where the North Korean government has developed
nuclear programs, losing the alliance with the USA would lead to the prohibitive
costs of defence for South Korea.
South Korea’s increasing cooperation with the USA, 2010–11
After the sinking of the South Korean patrol ship Cheonan in 2010, China’s
response was not what South Korea had expected. Although expressing its
condolences, China was not in line with South Korea’s effort to condemn North
Korea. In November 2010, only eight months after the Cheonan incident, North
Korea initiated intensive bombardment of the South Korean island of
Yeonpyong in the Yellow Sea, killing two civilians and two servicemen. This
incident came as a shock to the South Korean public, who were still suffering
from the tragic Cheonan sinking. North Korea’s artillery attack, which targeted
marine bases and even civilian properties in Yeonpyong, was recorded as the
worst provocation on South Korean territory since the Korean War in 1953. A
public opinion survey conducted by the East Asia Institute reported that 81.5
percent of respondents in South Korea felt insecure after the incident (Lee and
Jeong 2010).
South Korea immediately sought cooperation from regional powers, the USA,
Japan and China. The USA condemned North Korea’s actions without the
slightest hesitation.8 In July 2010, the two alliance partners had warned North
Korea by conducting military exercises (Invincible Spirit) in the East Sea of
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Korea, which included the aircraft carrier George Washington. The US-led
Combined Forces Command had taken back control of the annual US–South
Korea military exercise (Ulchi-Freedom Guardian), which had been led by the
South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff since 2008. South Korea and the USA had
increased pressure on North Korea by having South Korean forces lead the
Proliferation Strategic Initiative exercise (the first time for South Korea to do so).
Pyongyang claimed that such military exercises were tantamount to war against
North Korea. A few days after the Yeonpyong incident, US–South Korea joint
military exercises took place again. This time, the US carrier George Washington
went to the Yellow Sea, close to mainland China.
South Korea’s neighbours had different opinions with regard to these
exercises. Japan was in tune with South Korea’s effort. Prime Minister Kan
Naoto demanded that North Korea stop provocative actions immediately, while
agreeing with the South Korean president to strengthen cooperation in the wake
of the military skirmish between the two Koreas.9 However, China was critical
of South Korea’s firm stance against North Korea. Unhappy with military
exercises near its coastal waters, China registered an official protest against the
USA and South Korea. It argued that Beijing would be within striking distance
of the missiles which the USA and South Korea were planning to test during the
military exercises. A South Korean spokesperson responded stiffly that military
exercises with the USA were in the nation’s interest and an independent decision
made by the South Korean government regardless of China’s opposition.10
Accordingly, China made another diplomatic protest against South Korea.
Chinese leaders allowed Kim Jong-il to come to China in August 2010, only
three months after his visit to Beijing. This increased suspicion among the South
Korean people that the Sino-North Korean alliance had been revamped only
after the series of provocative actions on the part of Pyongyang. Although
Chinese leaders may have believed that they had been fair and neutral in dealing
with the two Koreas, South Korea regarded China’s action as support for the
North Korean regime. Representing South Korea’s expectations from China,
President Lee Myung-bak requested that China make a fairer and more
responsible gesture in inter-Korean relations during his conversation with
China’s state councillor, Dai Bing-guo. The stark difference between Seoul
and Beijing in responding to North Korea’s brazen behaviour began to create
tension in the Sino-South Korean relationship. Chinese newspapers claimed that
the US–South Korea alliance isolated North Korea even further, precluding the
communist regime from entering the international community (Global Times
2010b).
Changes in the MD policy
Having seen little evidence that China was restraining North Korea after the
Cheonan incident, South Korea revealed a subtle change. The government
began to speak publicly about cooperation with the USA over ballistic MD
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systems. The South Korean defence minister, Kim Tae-young, announced that
the nation was discussing various ways to cooperate with the USA. Later, the
two countries signed an agreement to conduct joint research. Seoul even
considered offering financial assistance to place the early warning radar of
USFK’s ballistic MD architecture in the Peninsula. Some experts have argued
that such a change in South Korea had been expected from the beginning of the
Lee administration, because Lee, as a conservative leader, had been trying to
reinforce the alliance. In contrast to such an expectation, the Lee government, in
fact, remained reluctant regarding the regional MD programs. Only after 2010
did South Korea exhibit a subtle change by going public about its technological
collaboration with the USA. Although some people argued that cooperation
between Washington and Seoul would be limited only to lower-tier MD systems
and mostly target North Korea’s ballistic missiles, a recent news document
revealed that the two alliance partners have discussed broadening the range of
KAMD to cover not only the Korean Peninsula, but also Okinawa and Guam
(Shindonga 2011). Such a move would require South Korea to introduce upper-
tier systems, which the country has so far avoided, in developing its air and
missile defence.
Conclusion
In the context of the South Korea–China–North Korea triangle, this article has
offered explanations for South Korea’s alliance strategies, which rely on both
the North Korean threat and the China factor. Specifically, the constant North
Korean threat and the perceived usefulness of China have led to bifurcated
alliance strategies in South Korea. The perceived usefulness of China has caused
Seoul’s intransigence with respect to US MD systems and the strategic
transformation of USFK—issues that are relevant to China’s security concern.
In the meantime, the constant North Korean threat has caused South Korea to
lend four-square support to the USA over non-regional issues in Iraq and
Afghanistan. However, as China proved to be ineffective after the military crises
in 2010, South Korea leaned more on the USA. Seoul conducted joint military
exercises with Washington in response to Pyongyang’s provocation, promoting
the spirit of alliance with the USA, despite China’s strong opposition. As a
result, the bilateral relations between South Korea and China were strained after
they exchanged acerbic criticism of each other’s actions. Moreover, South Korea
publicised possible cooperation with the USA over anti-missile technologies
(see Table 2).
The perceived usefulness of China offers more complete explanations than
major schools of thought in international relations. First, in contrast to the
balance of power argument that mainly predicts a gradual decrease in alliance
cooperation, this article explains why South Korea has taken on costly burdens
with regard to some alliance missions and why cooperation has taken place
outside the East Asia region. It also offers a better explanation for why
The China factor in the US–South Korea alliance 99
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [A
lm
a M
ate
r S
tud
ior
um
 - 
Un
ive
rsi
tà 
di 
Bo
log
na
] a
t 0
9:4
7 2
3 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
cooperation with the USA has increased, particularly after 2010, although the
logic of the balance of power argument predicts the opposite. Second, the new
model works better than analysis based on domestic politics in explaining under
what conditions South Korea would choose cooperation over intransigence vis-
à-vis the USA, and why a liberal, progressive leader, who was expected to resist
US requests, chose to accommodate his US partner. Third, this article gives a
better explanation than the identity-based argument for why the inconsistency
of Seoul’s policies exists, when dissimilar identities in South Korea and the USA
would only account for friction between the two alliance partners.
This article suggests that there are at least two policy implications. First, for the
USA, the course of South Korea’s actions discussed in this article suggests that the
USA will continue to gain support from South Korea as long as North Korea is
perceived to be a critical threat. In particular, it would be relatively easy for
Washington to receive assistance fromSeoul ifmilitary operations take place in the
Middle East and Africa. However, because of the perceived usefulness of China in
alleviating tension in the Peninsula, the USA would not receive strong support
from Seoul with regard to alliance tasks that attempt to contain China. Even so,
this does not necessarily mean that South Korea would improve its bilateral
relationship with China at the expense of the alliance. Rather, it is the result of
South Korea’s strategic dilemma in pursuing a strong alliance with Washington
whilst, simultaneously, maintaining economic and political ties with Beijing.
Second, for the Chinese government, the sinking of the Cheonan has
demonstrated that China could encounter some problems in its relations with
the two Koreas. Although China has taken a neutral position between North and
South Korea, it will confront difficulties maintaining equidistance in the future as
deepening Sino-South Korea relations increase South Korea’s expectations from
China. The closer Sino-South Korea relations become, the more South Korea will
expect from China. Then, Seoul might even attempt to win over Beijing against
Pyongyang. China’s failure to anticipate such changed expectations would drive
South Korea to the US side even further—a picture that would not be so pleasant
to Beijing. This implies that China’s bilateral relations with both North and
South Korea not only create a strategic advantage, but will also burden the
Chinese government if they are not well managed.
Table 2. South Korea’s alliance strategies
The perceived usefulness of China
China is perceived to be useful China is perceived to be useless
The North
Korean
threat
South Korea’s inconsistent strategies,
2000–9 (coexistence of cooperation and
friction with the USA)
South Korea’s cooperative strategies,
2010–11 (increased cooperation with
the USA)
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Ironically, this appears to be advantageous for the USA. In contrast to
Washington’s concerns, growing interactions between China and South Korea
would not always inflict damage on the US–South Korea alliance, but could
make the alliance even stronger in some instances.
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